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Inductive logic can be seen as the product of trying to answer the following question purely by applying logical, or ra-
tional, principles or considerations:
Given a sentence from a ﬁrst order language what belief, i.e. subjective probability, should I assign to it in the absence of
any further knowledge? More generally if I am required to assign probabilities to the sentences of this language and have
no further information to guide me how should I then choose my probability function?
The best possible outcome here, which harkens back to Johnson [13], and slightly later Carnap [1–4], would be to show
that such an apparently arbitrary choice is in fact forced once I am required to observe certain principles which it would be
deemed illogical or irrational in the circumstances (i.e. of having no further information) to ﬂout. For example distinguishing
between the probability I assigned to Pða1Þ and Pða2Þ when up to dummy subscripts these sentences are indistinguishable.
Whether or not this ideal is anything like attainable it is certainly the case that we can postulate putatively rational prin-
ciples restricting the possible choices of probability function, w say, and investigating their consequences and relationships,
much in the way we propose and investigate axioms in set theory.
Such a programme was initiated by Johnson et al. for purely unary languages and would, one assumes from the
comments of Carnap [1, pp. 123–124] in 1950 and Kemeny [14] in 1954, have progressed to higher arity relations had. All rights reserved.
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whole enterprise as a practical guide to our everyday belief formation. In consequence, with the notable exception of
[17,12] the step to polyadic inductive logic has only recently been seriously investigated, as in for example in
[20,21,24–28,30].
Apart from its intrinsic interest a major reason for reviving the Johnson–Carnap programme is that in the latter half of the
intervening 50 year hiatus uncertain reasoning has become topic of considerable interest and importance in artiﬁcial intel-
ligence. Whilst uncertain reasoning has always had a much wider scope than the Carnapian version of inductive logic this
latter clearly now falls under its umbrella, in particular within what might be termed ﬁrst order predicate probability logic.
Naturally much of the current research in that topic within artiﬁcial intelligence is aimed, ultimately, at practical applica-
tions which, given the practical shortcomings exposed by the GRUE paradox, might suggest that within this sphere inductive
logic was of no more than theoretical interest.
However the ‘practical shortcomings’ exposed by GRUE were concerned with human reasoning. In artiﬁcial intelligence
much of the reasoning concerns agents where the situation is very different. Unlike human beings these agents start life in a
form that can be truly close to ‘zero knowledge’ and if we have ideas and intuitions about what should be considered rational
or logical ways to reason and act in this context then we would seem bound to consider them as criteria. From this viewpoint
alone then reopening the mine of inductive logic would seem justiﬁed.
In this paper we shall continue the development cited above by proving some representation results for what we believe
to be an important class of probability functions relevant to this programme.
In more detail, our framework will be the full polyadic generalization of that introduced in [25]: Let L be a ﬁrst order
language containing ﬁnitely many relation symbols P1; P2; . . . ; Pq with arities r1; r2; . . . ; rq, respectively, countably many
constants a1; a2; a3; . . . (the implicit intention being that these exhaust the universe) and no function symbols nor equality.
For later use let Lð¼Þ be L with equality added. The language L will be ﬁxed throughout and it will be assumed to contain at
least one non-unary relation. Let SL; QFSL, respectively, denote the sentences and quantiﬁer free sentences of L.
Throughout we shall use b1; b2; . . . and b01; b02; . . . to denote distinct constants ai from L.
A function w : SL! ½0;1 is a probability function on L if it satisﬁes that for all h;/; 9xwðxÞ 2 SL:
(P1) If ‘ h then wðhÞ ¼ 1.
(P2) If ‘ qðh ^ /Þ then wðh _ /Þ ¼ wðhÞ þwð/Þ.
(P3) wð9xwðxÞÞ ¼ limn!1w
Wn
i¼1wðaiÞ
 
:
By a theorem of Gaifman (see [7]) any probability function deﬁned on QFSL (i.e. satisfying (P1) and (P2) for h;/ 2 QFSL)
extends uniquely to a probability function on L. Hence we can limit our considerations to probability functions deﬁned just
on QFSL. By the disjunctive normal form theorem it then follows that w is determined simply by its values on the state
descriptions, that is sentences of the form Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ whereHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ ¼
q^
s¼1
^
i1 ;i2 ;...;irs2f1;...;mg
Psðbi1 ; bi2 ; . . . ; birs Þ ð1Þwhere P stands for P or qP, respectively. We use SDðm;~bÞ to denote the set of such state descriptions on m, or just SDðmÞ
when ~b is implicit in the context. If there is any danger of confusion we write SDLðmÞ; SDLðm;~bÞ to indicate the language
involved.
An important property which will be frequently used is that for a probability function w, a state descriptionHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ
and nP m, we havewðHðb1; . . . ; bmÞÞ ¼
X
W2SDðnÞ
Wðb1 ;...;bnÞHðb1 ;...;bmÞ
wðWðb1; . . . ; bnÞÞ: ð2ÞAs explained above the intention here is thatw should correspond to a ‘rational’ assignment of probabilities on the sentences
of L where ‘rational’ is to be captured by requiring w to satisfy certain principles which we judge are at least necessary for
this rationality requirement. Of these the most basic is surely constant exchangeability, the requirement that since there is
nothing in their properties to distinguish one constant from another w should be invariant under permutations of the con-
stants. More precisely:
The constant exchangeability principle (Ex)
If h0 is the result of replacing a constant ai throughout the sentence h by a constant aj not already appearing in h then
wðh0Þ ¼ wðhÞ.
Henceforth we shall assume, usually without further mention, that all the probability functions we consider satisfy Ex.
In the case that L is a purely unary language, that is all the relations in L are unary, de Finetti’s Representation Theorem
tells us exactly what the probability functions w on L look like. Since this result is relevant to what follows we shall spend a
little time explaining it.
Suppose for the moment that the relation symbols P1; P2; . . . ; Pq of L are all unary. In this case the state descriptions
Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ have the simple form
3 Kin
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i¼1
ahi ðbiÞwhere the a1ðxÞ; . . . ;a2q ðxÞ run through the atoms
P1ðxÞ ^ P2ðxÞ ^    ^ PqðxÞof L.
Given~p ¼ hp1; p2; . . . ;p2q i 2 D2q ¼ hx1; x2; . . . ; x2q i jxi P 0;
X2q
i¼1
xi ¼ 1
( )deﬁne the probability function w~p on L byw~p
m^
i¼1
ahi ðbiÞ
 !
¼
Ym
i¼1
phi ¼
Y2q
j¼1
p
rj
jwhere rj is the number of times j appears amongst the h1;h2; . . . ;hm. Then w~p satisﬁes Ex and furthermore.
Theorem 1 (de Finetti’s representation theorem [6]). Let w be a probability function on the unary language L. Then w satisﬁes
Ex if and only if there is a measure l on D2q such that for any state description
Vm
i¼1ahi ðbiÞ,w
m^
i¼1
ahi ðbiÞ
 !
¼
Z Y2q
j¼1
p
rj
j dlð~pÞ ¼
Z
w~p
m^
i¼1
ahi ðbiÞ
 !
dlð~pÞ;where rj is the number of times j appears amongst the h1;h2; . . . ; hm.
We remark that if instead of Ex we take the stronger Atom Exchangeability, Ax, meaning thatw
m^
i¼1
ahi ðbiÞ
 !
¼ w
m^
i¼1
arðhiÞðbiÞ
 !whenever r is a permutation of f1;2; . . . ;2qg then the same representation result holds but with l required to be invariant
under permutations of the coordinates.
de Finetti’s Theorem plays a central role in the study of conventional, unary, inductive logic, ﬁrstly because it gives us
transparent access to examples of probability functions satisfying Ex and Ax and secondly, and most importantly, because
it enables us to restyle problems from inductive logic in the elementary differential and integral calculus where we already
have well developed intuitions and techniques.
The above results apply when the language is purely unary. What we want to do now is to revert back to a not purely
unary language L and derive some de Finetti style representation theorems in that case. For Ex such a theorem has already
been proved by Hoover, [12] (see also the earlier [17]). What we shall do in this paper is prove such results (they split into
two cases) for w satisfying spectrum exchangeability, Sx, the polyadic generalization of atom exchangeability. Spectrum
exchangeability appears, see [20,21,25,28], to be a central concept in polyadic inductive logic so we would argue that a rep-
resentation theorem of this form promises to be of some value in future. Indeed the methods and results of this paper have
already found applications, see [19,20,22], in the derivation of principles of language invariance and (polyadic) instantial rel-
evance. This later topic has, since the initial development by Carnap, been central to inductive logic and is one where, in the
unary case, de Finetti’s theorem had previously proved a most effective tool, see [8,29].
We should remark at this point that in the unary context there has been a technically somewhat similar (and earlier)
development to the one we give here for polyadic inductive logic, directed towards the study within probability theory of
exchangeable partitions, see in particular Kingman [15,16] and Zabell [31, Chapter 10], and its application to inductive reason-
ing in the situation where the number of classes into which future observations may fall is not ﬁxed in advance. Whilst that
is essentially for unary properties and not relations we shall see an overlap in the penultimate section of this paper (Corollary
133) once we allow equality into our languages. It indeed seems possible that one could work back to some of the results in this
paper from that point, though for the sake of selfcontainedness, accessibility and familiarity of context and ethos within logic
our present approach seems to us justiﬁed.
The plan of this paper will be as follows. In the next section we shall explain the principle of spectrum exchangeability
and describe a family of probability functions on Lwhich satisfy this principle and, ultimately, will act like the w~p in the ver-
sion of de Finetti’s theorem stated above, at least for the class of homogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx. The main
theorem to this effect will then be proved. Following that we shall give a similar result for heterogeneous probability
functions satisfying Sx. Together these will effectively encompass all probability functions satisfying Sx. Finally we givegman’s result corresponds to the case when the language Lð¼Þ contains only equality.
38 J. Landes et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 35–55an application of the representation theorem to characterize when a probability function on L satisfying Sx can be extended
to Lð¼Þ and continue to satisfy Sx.
2. Spectrum exchangeability
In order to explain spectrum exchangeability we need to introduce some notation. Given H 2 SDðm;~bÞ, we deﬁne an
equivalence H on f1;2; . . . ;mg as follows:
iHj if wheneverH0ðb1; . . . ; bmÞ is obtained fromHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ by replacing some of the occurrences of bi by bj and/or some
of the occurrences bj by bi then H
0ðb1; . . . ; bmÞ is consistent with Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ. Putting it another way iHj if
Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ ^ bi ¼ bjis consistent with the axioms of equality (for the language Lð¼Þ), which we may also express as ‘bi; bj are indistinguishable
with respect to Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ’.
Clearly H is an equivalence relation.
In practice we shall sometimes also write biHbj in place of iHj and treat H as the corresponding equivalence relation
on fb1; . . . ; bm g.
A spectrum onm of length s is a vector~s ¼ hs1; s2; . . . ; ssi of natural numbers with s1 P s2 P   P ss > 0 and
Ps
i¼1si ¼ m.
We use SpecðmÞ for the set of spectra onm and denote the length of a spectrum~s by j~sj. ForH a state description the spectrum
of H, denoted SðHÞ, is deﬁned to be the vector of sizes of the (non-empty) equivalence classes with respect to H, in non-
increasing order.
The spectrum exchangeability principle (Sx)
If Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;Uðb01; b02; . . . ; b0mÞ are state descriptions and SðHÞ ¼SðUÞ thenwðHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞÞ ¼ w U b01; b02; . . . ; b0m
  
:This means that w of a state description Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ depends only on the spectrum~s ¼SðHÞ, not on any other speciﬁc
property of H nor on the particular constants b1; b2; . . . ; bm. In particular Ex follows from Sx.
So, for example, in the case of a language with a single binary relation R, the state descriptions given by the conjunctions
ofqRða1; a1Þ Rða1; a2Þ Rða1; a3Þ qRða1; a4Þ
Rða2; a1Þ qRða2; a2Þ qRða2; a3Þ Rða2; a4Þ
Rða3; a1Þ qRða3; a2Þ qRða3; a3Þ Rða3; a4Þ
Rða4; a1Þ Rða4; a2Þ Rða4; a3Þ Rða4; a4ÞandRða1; a1Þ Rða1; a4Þ qRða1; a5Þ qRða1; a7Þ
Rða4; a1Þ Rða4; a4Þ qRða4; a5Þ qRða4; a7Þ
Rða5; a1Þ Rða5; a4Þ qRða5; a5Þ Rða5; a7Þ
qRða7; a1Þ qRða7; a4Þ Rða7; a5Þ Rða7; a7Þboth have spectra {2,1,1}, the equivalence classes in the ﬁrst being {1}, {2,3}, {4} and in the latter {1,4}, {5}, {7}, and so accord-
ing to Sx should be given the same probability. Notice that up to specifying the particular constants involved we could
equally well have represented these state descriptions as, say, {0,1} matrices0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
and
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1which is often a good way of visualizing what is going on.
Sx is the direct generalization of atom exchangeability from unary to polyadic languages since to say that two state
descriptionsm^
i¼1
agi ðbiÞ;
m^
i¼1
ahi ðbiÞin a unary language with atoms a1ðxÞ; . . . ;a2q ðxÞ have the same spectrum is just to say that the multisets
f jfbi jgi ¼ 1gj; jfbi jgi ¼ 2gj; . . . ; jfbi jgi ¼ 2qgjg
f jfbi jhi ¼ 1gj; jfbi jhi ¼ 2gj; . . . ; jfbi jhi ¼ 2qgjgare equal, which is equivalent to saying that there is a permutation r of f1;2; . . . ;2qg such that
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i¼1
ahi ðbiÞ;
m^
i¼1
arðgiÞðbiÞare the same up to a permutation of the constants bi. Ax then, together with the standing assumption of Ex, is equivalent tow
m^
i¼1
ahi ðbiÞ
 !
¼ w
m^
i¼1
agi ðbiÞ
 !i.e. Sx for this unary language.
In turn then Sx can be justiﬁed in a similar fashion to Ax.4 In short that knowing nothing about the individual relations the
only reason we might have for giving different probabilities to the state descriptions Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;U b01; b02; . . . ; b0m
 
is be-
cause they have different spectra.5
However there is another reason for promoting, or at least being interested in, the principle Sx. One is that Sx has a num-
ber of desirable consequences for issues such as conformity, language invariance and instantial relevance, see [23] for a sur-
vey. In short Sx goes a very long way in clarifying the study of polyadic inductive logic, in a way that no other principle
proposed in the half century or so since Carnap and Kemeny ﬁrst pointed to the challenge of going beyond just unary pred-
icates has come near to emulating. In subjects such as set theory axioms are commonly proposed because of their value in
clarifying and bringing order to chaos and there seems to us no reason why such a criterion should not also apply here to the
study and standing of spectrum exchangeability.
Given spectra~s onm and ~r on n letHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ be a state description withSðHÞ ¼~s and deﬁneNð~s; ~rÞ to be the num-
ber of state descriptions Wðb1; . . . ; bnÞ with spectrum ~r on n that extend H, in other words such that Wðb1; . . . ; bnÞ
 Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ. It is shown in [18], and in [24,25] for binary L, thatNð~s; ~rÞ is correctly deﬁned in that it does not depend
on which H with spectrum ~s is chosen. Note that for w satisfying Sx and H 2 SDðmÞ with spectrum ~s the Eq. (2) becomeswðHÞ ¼
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
Nð~s; ~rÞwð~rÞ ð3Þfor all nP m, where wð~rÞ stands for (any) wðWÞ with SðWÞ ¼ ~r.
Finally let ~1t denote the spectrum with length t and every coordinate equal to 1.3. The probability functions up
In this section we will introduce some basic probability functions, up, which will act like thew~p in the version of the stated
de Finetti theorem in the case of our main representation result.
LetB ¼ hx0; x1; x2; . . .i jx1 P x2 P   P 0; x0 P 0;
X1
i¼0
xi ¼ 1
( )and endow B with the standard weak product topology inherited from ½0;11, that is using as the open basis the sets of the
formððd1; e1Þ \ ½0;1Þ  ððd2; e2Þ \ ½0;1Þ      ððdk; ekÞ \ ½0;1Þ  ½0;1  ½0;1     :
Letp ¼ hp0; p1; p2; . . .i 2 B:We shall be thinking of pi as the probability of picking ‘colour’ i (from some urn). Amongst these colours 0 will stand for the
colour ‘black’ and will have a special status as we shall shortly explain.
By induction on m 2 N we shall now simultaneously deﬁne probabilitiesjpðHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞnson and Carnap were both apparently willing to accept a stronger principle, the so called Johnson’s Sufﬁcientness Principle, which with Ex implies Ax.
eneralizations of this stronger Principle to the present context of polyadic inductive logic appear problematic, see [18,30], though its extension to the
ontext where the number of classes is not ﬁxed beforehand (see [15,16,31,5] for the wider framework of predictive lower previsions), or to polyadic
es with equality (see [23]) yields characterizations analogous to those of Carnap’s Continuum [2].
original justiﬁcation for Sx was different from this but since it relied on considerations rather outside the remit of this paper we shall just refer the
o [25].
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~c ¼ hc1; c2; . . . ; cmi 2 f0;1;2; . . . gm:The idea behind the number jpðHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ is that it is the probability of picking the colours c1; c2; . . . ; cm in that order
and after each such choice ci of colour picking a state description Hiðb1; b2; . . . ; biÞ extending the one we already have (i.e.
Hi1ðb1; b2; . . . ; bi1Þ, where H0 ¼ >) in such a way that after m choices we have picked colours c1; c2; . . . ; cm and have
constructed Hmðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ ¼ Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ. However some rules will apply concerning the permitted choice of exten-
sion Hiðb1; . . . ; biÞ of Hi1ðb1; . . . ; bi1Þ. These rules will ensure that if j; k 6 i and cj ¼ ck – 0 (i.e. they are the same non-black
colour) then bj and bk will be indistinguishable with respect to Hiðb1; b2; . . . ; biÞ.
In the case that ci already appears amongst c1; c2; . . . ; ci1 but is not black (i.e. ci – 0) Hiðb1; . . . ; biÞ must be that unique
extension of Hi1ðb1; . . . ; bi1Þ in which bi is indistinguishable from the earlier bj for which cj ¼ ci. (Since the bj associated
with that colour are all indistinguishable from each other with respect to Hi1ðb1; b2; . . . ; bi1Þ this will not cause any con-
ﬂict.) So in this case there is only one choice of extension and the equivalence classes of Hi are just those of Hi1 but with
i joining the equivalence class containing those j < i for which cj ¼ ci. Note however that there may be other k < i in this
same class but associated with different colours.
In the case when ci is 0 (i.e. colour black) or a new colour which has not already appeared Hiðb1; b2; . . . ; biÞ can be any
extension of Hi1ðb1; b2; . . . ; bi1Þ which has the property that if j; k < i and cj ¼ ck – 0 then bj; bk continue to remain indis-
tinguishable with respect to Hiðb1; b2; . . . ; biÞ. In this case all these possible choices of extension Hiðb1; b2; . . . ; biÞ are given
equal probability and i may or may not join an existing equivalence class of Hi1 . If it does not join an existing class but
forms one of its own it may result in some of the equivalence classes of Hi1 splitting apart in Hi . This can happen because
classes in Hi1 may contain j; k with cj – ck and there is no requirement in the choice of Hiðb1; b2; . . . ; biÞ that bi respects the
current indistinguishability of such bj; bk (unlike the case when they correspond to the same non-black colour). Notice then
that if bi gets colour black, i.e. ci ¼ 0, then there will be no requirement for any other bj, of any colour, to remain for ever
indistinguishable from bi. Indeed since we must have had p0 > 0 to have ever chosen black in the ﬁrst place in almost all
future biþ1; biþ2; . . . black at least will have been chosen inﬁnitely often and with probability 1 will distinguish bi from any
other bj.
To give an example here for the language with a single binary relation R letp ¼ hp0;p1;p2;p3;p4;p5; . . .i ¼ h1=5;1=3;2=7;19=105;0; 0; . . .i
and let H1ðb1Þ;H2ðb1; b2Þ;H3ðb1; b2; b3Þ be respectively the conjunctions ofRðb1; b1Þ Rðb1; b1Þ Rðb1; b2Þ Rðb1; b1Þ Rðb1; b2Þ qRðb1; b3Þ
Rðb2; b1Þ Rðb2; b2Þ Rðb2; b1Þ Rðb2; b2Þ qRðb2; b3Þ
Rðb3; b1Þ Rðb3; b2Þ Rðb3; b3Þ
In this casejpðH1; h2iÞ ¼ 2=7 1=2 ¼ 1=7
since p2 ¼ 2=7 and there is a probability 1/2 of picking H1ðb1Þ (rather than qRðb1; b1Þ). NextjpðH2; h2;2iÞ ¼ jpðH1; h2iÞ  2=7 ¼ 2=49
since once colour 2 has be chosen again, with probability 2/7, there is no choice of the next state description, b2 must be
indistinguishable from b1 so it must be H2ðb1; b2Þ. FinallyjpðH3; h2;2;0iÞ ¼ jpðH2; h2;2iÞ  1=5 1=8 ¼ 1=980
since the probability of choosing the black 0 is 1/5 and H3ðb1; b2; b3Þ is one of the 8 equiprobable state descriptions on
b1; b2; b3 which extend H2ðb1; b2Þ and preserve the indistinguishability of b1; b2 (which is required since they are associated
with the same colour).
Similarly one can check thatjpðH3; h1;2;0iÞ ¼ 1=3 1=2 2=7 1=23  1=5 1=25;
jpðH3; h1;2;2iÞ ¼ 0;this latter since H3ðb1; b2; b3Þ is not a possible choice in the last step because the second choice of colour 2 necessitates b3
being indistinguishable from b2 in the subsequent choice of state description extending H2ðb1; b2Þ, which it is not in
H3ðb1; b2; b3Þ.
Having spent some time giving a fairly full but informal description of this process and what it entails we now give a for-
mal summary of the construction: For m ¼ 0 set jpð>; ;Þ ¼ 1. Suppose that at stage m we have deﬁned the probabilities
jpðHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ. For each such pair Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ,~c pick a colour cmþ1 from 0;1;2; . . . according to the probabilities
p0; p1; p2; . . . and let~cþ ¼ hc1; . . . ; cm; cmþ1i:
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Hþðb1; b2; . . . ; bm; bmþ1Þ for which bjHþbmþ1. On the other hand if cmþ1 is 0 or a colour different from all those previously cho-
sen then randomly choose a state descriptionHþðb1; b2; . . . ; bm; bmþ1Þ extendingHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ so that when i; j 6 q are such
that ci ¼ cj – 0 then biHþbj (where ‘randomly’ means that we take all possibilities with equal probability).6
Clearly for this new pairHþðb1; b2; . . . ; bm; bmþ1Þ and c1; c2; . . . ; cm; cmþ1 there is only this one possible pairHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ
and c1; c2; . . . ; cm that it could have arisen from, and there is a well deﬁned probability of this coming about through the
choices of extensions to the state description Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ and the sequence of colours c1; c2; . . . ; cm.
Let jpðHþ;~cþÞ be jpðH;~cÞ times this probability as described of going fromH;~c toHþ;~cþ by the above process. Overall then
jpðHþ;~cþÞ is the probability of getting to this pair through a string of choices starting with the empty state description > and
the empty sequence of colours.
Having deﬁned jpðH;~cÞ now set6 An
7 In t
8 ThiupðHÞ ¼
X
~c
jpðH;~cÞ:By a straightforward generalization of the result in [25] (where just two colours were considered) up satisﬁes Sx (and hence
also Ex).
It is easy to see that when l is a probability measure on B and we deﬁnewðHÞ ¼
Z
B
upðHÞdlðpÞ ð4Þthen w is a probability function on SL satisfying Sx.
Our aim is to show that the converse is true in the case that w is homogeneous, where
w is homogeneous if for all klim
n!1
X
H2SDðnÞ
jSðHÞj¼k
wðHða1; a2; . . . ; anÞÞ ¼ 0:We shall then go on to show a similar representation theorem in the case when w is t-heterogeneous, where
w is t-heterogeneous iflim
n!1
X
H2SDðnÞ
jSðHÞj¼t
wðHða1; a2; . . . ; anÞÞ ¼ 1:In other words the probability that all the ai will fall in some t (non-empty) equivalence classes with respect to indistinguish-
ability is 1. Note that for a t-heterogenous w, wðWÞ ¼ 0 whenever jSðWÞj > t.
Between them these two cases effectively cover all w satisfying Sx since by [25, Theorem 7]7 every w satisfying Sx can be
represented8 in the formw ¼
X1
t¼0
gtw
½twhere the gt P 0;
P1
t¼0gt ¼ 1, the w½t satisfy Sx, w½0 is homogeneous and w½t is t-heterogeneous for t > 0.
In the next section we will, after a series of lemmas, give a proof of this main theorem for homogeneous w satisfying Sx.
4. The representation theorem – homogenous case
We shall need some more notation:
For H 2 SDðmÞ let Rf ðHÞ stand for the set of partitions d ¼ fdð1Þ; . . . ; dðldÞg that are reﬁnements of H.
For d 2 Rf ðHÞ let ZðdÞ be the set of mappings q from f1; . . . ; ldg to f0;1;2; . . .g that satisfyif qðiÞ ¼ qðjÞ then i ¼ j or qðiÞ ¼ qðjÞ ¼ 0; ð5Þ
if qðiÞ ¼ 0 then jdðiÞj ¼ 1; ð6Þand let ZtðdÞ be the set of injective mappings from f1; . . . ; ldg to f1;2; . . . ; tg.
The following lemma follows directly from the deﬁnition of the up.
Lemma 2. For a state description Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ we haveupðHÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZðdÞ
1
jSDðldÞj
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ : ð7Þoverzealous attempt to simplify the corresponding deﬁnition given in [19, p. 4] regrettably led to the effective omission of the condition ci ¼ cj – 0.
his paper the result is given for L a binary language but the general result follows analogously, see [18].
s representation is unique up to a free choice of the w½i when gi ¼ 0.
42 J. Landes et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 35–55Proof. Consider a contribution jpðHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ to upðHÞ. Deﬁne the equivalence relation ~c on f1;2; . . . ;mg byi~cj () ci ¼ cj – 0 or i ¼ j and ci ¼ 0
and letd ¼ fdð1Þ; . . . ; dðldÞgbe the set of equivalence classes of ~c. Notice that because jpðHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ provides a contribution to upðHÞ it must be the
case that the partition d reﬁnes H. In addition~c determines a map q 2 ZðdÞ given byqðjÞ ¼ q if ci ¼ q for i 2 dðjÞand in turn we can recapture~c from d and q.
Through picking these colours jpðHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ accumulates a factor of
Qld
i¼1p
jdðiÞj
qðiÞ . The other factor in j
pðHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ
arises through the choices of them extensions which eventually giveHðb1; . . . ; bmÞ. When ci is a non-black previously chosen
colour the extension is unique so the probability of the (no) choice is 1. Thus there are ld genuine choices. Performing all of
them corresponds to a unique state description in SDðldÞ. Hence the probability of making the choices resulting in
Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ must be jSDðldÞj1, which accounts for that factor in (7) and completes the proof. h
We now exhibit two, rather technical, expressions forNð;; ~rÞ;Nð~s; ~rÞ where ; is the empty spectrum:
Lemma 3. Let m < n and let ~s ¼ hs1; . . . ; ssi be a spectrum on m and ~r ¼ hr1; . . . ;rti a spectrum on n. Let qi be the number
entries in ~r equal to i. Assume that Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ 2 SDðmÞ has spectrum ~s. ThenNð;; ~rÞ ¼ 1Qn
i¼1qi!
n
~r
 
N ;;~1t
 
; ð8Þ
Nð~s; ~rÞ ¼ 1Qn
i¼1qi!
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZtðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
N ~rd;~1t
 
; ð9Þand henceNð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
Nð~rd;~1tÞ
Nð;;~1tÞ
X
q2ZtðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
n
~r
 1
; ð10Þwhere
	 n~r
 
stands for n!Qt
i¼1ri !
	 ~rd is the vector hr1; . . . ; rsi where the ri are numbers of classes into which d partitions classes of H, in a non-increasing
order of size.
	 the expression nmrq  jdj;rrest
 
stands forðnmÞ!Qld
i¼1ðrqðiÞ  jdðiÞjÞ!
Q
kRImðqÞrk!with the convention that this is 0 if some rqðiÞ < jdðiÞj.Proof. Any state descriptionUðb1; . . . ; bnÞwith spectrum ~r is uniquely characterized by its canonical representation, that is by
the sequence B1;B2; . . . ;Bt of equivalence classes of H arranged so thatminB1 < minB2 <    < minBt;
together with the state description WðbminB1 ; bminB2 ; . . . ; bminBt Þ with spectrum ~1t (where t ¼ j~rj) which is the restriction of
Uðb1; . . . ; bnÞ to bminB1 ; bminB2 ; . . . ; bminBt . [For example in the case L has a single binary predicate R and Uða1; a2; a3; a4; a5Þ is
the conjunction ofRða1; a1Þ Rða1; a2Þ qRða1; a3Þ Rða1; a4Þ qRða1; a5Þ
Rða2; a1Þ Rða2; a2Þ qRða2; a3Þ Rða2; a4Þ qRða2; a5Þ
Rða3; a1Þ Rða3; a2Þ Rða3; a3Þ Rða3; a4Þ Rða3; a5Þ
Rða4; a1Þ Rða4; a2Þ qRða4; a3Þ Rða4; a4Þ qRða4; a5Þ
Rða5; a1Þ Rða5; a2Þ Rða5; a3Þ Rða5; a4Þ Rða5; a5Þ
J. Landes et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 35–55 43the equivalence classes of U are {1,2,4}, {3,5} and the canonical representation is given by the state description which is the
conjunction ofRða1; a1Þ qRða1; a3Þ
Rða3; a1Þ Rða3; a3Þand the sets {1,2,4}, {3,5}. For more details see [24,25, p. 748] for L binary and [18] for the general result.] Hence formula (8).
For the formula (9) assume ﬁrst that all the rj are different and consider a state description Uðb1; . . . ; bnÞ on n with
spectrum ~r, extending H. Restricted to f1; . . . ;mg;U must be a reﬁnementd ¼ fdð1Þ; dð2Þ; . . . ; dðldÞgof H. Note that state descriptions corresponding to different d’s must be different. We continue with the aim of counting
those state descriptions corresponding to a ﬁxed d. Each of them is uniquely characterized by a state description on t with
spectrum ~1t such that its restriction to the ﬁrst ld coordinates corresponds to H restricted tofbk jk ¼min dðiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; ldg;by an injective mappingq : f1;2; . . . ; ldg ! f1;2; . . . ; tgand by a partition of fmþ 1; . . . ;ng into t classes (some possibly empty) of sizes r1 ; . . . ;rt whererk ¼
rqðiÞ  jdðiÞj if k ¼ qðiÞ;
rk otherwise:
The number of such mappings and partitions isX
q2ZtðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
:This gives the result in the case that all the rj are different. Otherwise let qi be the number of rj equal to i. Then, as compared
with the expression obtained above when all the rj were different we will now be counting each ~r
Qn
i¼0qi! times. Hence this
divisor in (9). h
Lemma 4. Let p 2 B;H 2 SDðmÞ and d ¼ fdð1Þ; . . . ; dðldÞg 2 Rf ðHÞ. Let g > 0 and G 2 N be such that pj < g for j > G: Let ZGðdÞ
stand for the set of those q from ZðdÞ that moreover satisfyif qðiÞ > G then jdðiÞj ¼ 1: ð11Þ
ThenX
q2ZðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ 
X
q2ZGðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ
					
					 6 ldg:Similarly when we replace pjdðiÞjqðiÞ by some f ðpqðiÞ; jdðiÞjÞ with f satisfyingf ðp; dÞ 6 pd:Proof. Assume i0 is such that jdði0Þj > 1. Then the sum, over all distinct choices of the q with qði0Þ > G, ofYld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞis less than g since it is bounded byX
j>G
pjdði0Þjj
 ! Y
i2f1;2;...;ldgfi0g
X1
j¼0
pj
 !jdðiÞjandX1
j¼0
pj ¼ 1 and
X
j>G
pjdði0Þjj
 !
6
X
j>G
p2j
 !
6 g
X
j>G
pj
 !
6 g:The lemma follows since there are at most ld choices of i0. h
44 J. Landes et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 35–55We remark that if the p from Lemma 4 is such thatpi ¼ 0 for i ¼ 0 and for i > t
then ZðdÞ and ZGðdÞmay be replaced by ZtðdÞ and ZtGðdÞ, respectively (where ZtGðdÞ is the set of those q from ZtðdÞ that satisfy
(11)).
Lemma 5. Continuing to use the notation of Lemma 3, for a ﬁxed d,X
q2ZtðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
n
~r
 1
¼
X
q2Zt ðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
þ O n12
 where the O term does not depend on ~r.
Proof. Let d be ﬁxed. We haveX
q2ZtðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
n
~r
 1
¼
X
q2ZtðdÞ
Qld
i¼1rqðiÞðrqðiÞ  1Þ . . . ðrqðiÞ  jdðiÞj þ 1Þ
nðn 1Þ . . . ðnmþ 1Þ
¼ n
mm!
n!
X
q2Zt ðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
rqðiÞ
n
 1
n
 
. . .
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj  1
n
 
: ð12ÞLet G be such thatrj P n
1
2 for 1 6 i 6 G and pj < n
1
2 for j > G:If q 2 ZtGðdÞ then for 1 6 i 6 ld we have jdðiÞj ¼ 1 or rqðiÞ > n
1
2 so1 jdðiÞjn12
 jdðiÞj rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
6 rqðiÞ
n
rqðiÞ
n
 1
n
 
. . .
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj  1
n
 
6 rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
and hence (using the facts that jdðiÞj 6 m and Pldi¼1jdðiÞj ¼ m)ð1mn12Þm
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
6
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
rqðiÞ
n
 1
n
 
. . .
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj  1
n
 
6
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
:Summing over q 2 ZtGðdÞ we obtainX
q2ZtGðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
rqðiÞ
n
 1
n
 
. . .
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj  1
n
 
¼ 1þ Oðn12Þ
  X
q2ZtGðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
0
@
1
A
jdðiÞj
: ð13ÞWe haveX
q2ZtGðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
6
X
q2ZtðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
6
X
q2ZtðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 
6
Xt
i¼1
ri
n
 !ld
6 1so (13) givesX
q2ZtGðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
rqðiÞ
n
 1
n
 
. . .
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj  1
n
 
¼
X
q2ZtGðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
0
@
1
A
jdðiÞj
þ Oðn12Þ :By Lemma 4 this changes by at most ldn
1
2 when ZtGðdÞ is replaced by ZtðdÞ so the lemma follows from (12) sincenm
nðn 1Þ . . . ðnmþ 1Þ ¼ 1þ Oðn
1Þ: LetH ¼ y ¼ hy1; y2; . . .i jy1 P y2 P   P 0;
X1
i¼1
yi 6 1
( )and endow H with the standard weak product topology inherited from ½0;11.
Unlike B;H is a compact space.
For y 2 H deﬁney0 ¼ 1
X1
i¼1
yi and hðyÞ ¼ hy0; y1; y2; . . .iso h is a bijection from H to B.
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r1
n
;
r2
n
; . . .
rt
n
;0; 0; . . .
D E 
¼
X
W2SDðnÞ
SðWÞ¼~r
wðWÞ ¼Nð;; ~rÞwð~rÞfor ~r ¼ hr1;r2; . . . ;rti a spectrum on n, and lnðyÞ ¼ 0 otherwise.
By (3) we have for H 2 SDðmÞ;SðHÞ ¼~s and n > m,wðHÞ ¼
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rti
Nð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞln
r1
n
;
r2
n
; . . .
rt
n
;0;0; . . .
D E 
: ð14ÞThis identity will be key in our proof of the main theorem in the case of homogeneous w. In short we shall arrange that as n
tends to inﬁnity the summation becomes an integral, the fractionNð~s; ~rÞNð;; ~rÞ1 becomes uhðpÞðHÞ and the ln become a
limit measure ~l. As a result we will obtain the following theorem from which our main Representation Theorem for homo-
geneous probability functions satisfying Sx is a straightforward corollary.
Theorem 6. If w is homogeneous and satisﬁes Sx then there is a probability measure ~l on H such that forHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ a state
descriptionwðHÞ ¼
Z
H
uhðyÞðHÞd~lðyÞ:Furthermore any such probability function w on SL deﬁned in this way satisﬁes Sx (though not necessarily homogeneity).
Proof. H is compact so the ln have a convergent subsequence – let ~l be such a limit. As indicated above, the proof is via
taking the limit as n tends to inﬁnity in (14) so in what follows H (and hence also ~s; s and m) are ﬁxed. However, t varies
with ~r which ranges over SpecðnÞ. Note that since w is homogenous for any ﬁxed t we havelim
n!1
X
W2SDðnÞ
jSðWÞj¼t
wðWÞ ¼ 0: ð15ÞFirst considerNð~s; ~rÞNð;; ~rÞ1 for a given ~r, as it is expressed in (10). For a ﬁxed d ¼ fdð1Þ; . . . ; dðldÞg the ratio
Nð~rd;~1tÞ
Nð;;~1tÞis within Oðt22tÞ of jSDðldÞj1 since bothNð;;~1tÞ
jSDðtÞj  1
 !
and
Nð~rd;~1tÞ
jSDðtÞj 
1
SDðldÞj j
 !are Oðt22tÞ. To see these notice that for a ﬁxed state description Uðb1; . . . ; blÞ the probability that a random state description
Wðb1; . . . ; btÞ extending Uðb1; . . . ; blÞ has iWj for i – j is less than 2lt (by our convention that not all relation symbols in L are
unary). Hence the probability that such an extension does not have spectrum~1t is less than t22
lt . Consequently, by Lemma 5
and since there are only a ﬁnite number (less than mm) of the d in Rf ðHÞ, the identity (10) gives thatNð~s; ~rÞNð;; ~rÞ1 is
within O n12
 
þ Oðt22tÞ ofX
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZtðdÞÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj 1
jSDðldÞj :Writingy~r ¼
r1
n
; . . .
rt
n
;0;0; . . .
D E
;by Lemma 2 we haveX
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZtðdÞÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj 1
jSDðldÞj ¼ u
hðy~rÞðHÞ(since in the expression (7) with p ¼ hðyrÞ only the q 2 ZtðdÞ give non-zero contributions) soNð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞ ¼ u
hðy~rÞðHÞ þ O n12
 
þ Oðt22tÞ:
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X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rti
uhðy~rÞðHÞln
r1
n
; . . .
rt
n
;0; 0; . . .
D E 
þ O n12
 
þ
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rti
Oðt22tÞln
r1
n
; . . .
rt
n
; 0;0; . . .
D E 
:Taking in account the deﬁnition of ln this becomeswðHÞ ¼
Z
H
uhðyÞðHÞdlnðyÞ þ O n
1
2
 
þ
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rti
Oðt22tÞ
X
W2SDðnÞ
SðWÞ¼~r
wðWÞ: ð16ÞTo conclude the proof we need the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Let Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ be a state description with spectrum hs1; . . . ; ssi. Then the function
f ðyÞ ¼ uhðyÞðHÞ ¼ uhðyÞðhs1; . . . ; ssiÞis continuous on H.
Before proving the lemmawe note how the theorem follows: Allowing n to tend to inﬁnity, by virtue of the compactness ofH
and the above lemma the ﬁrst summand in (16) becomesZ
H
uhðyÞðHÞd~lðyÞand the second summand disappears. The third summand isXn
t¼1
Oðt22tÞ
X
W2SDðnÞ
jSðWÞj¼t
wðWÞand this tends to 0 by (15) since w is homogenous. h
Proof of Lemma 7. Letp ¼ hp0;p1;p2; . . .i 2 B
and G 2 N. We deﬁneIGðpÞ ¼ 1
XG
i¼1
pi; p1;p2; . . . ; pG; 0;0; . . . :
* +
:First we shall show the following claim:upðHÞ ¼ uIGðpÞðHÞ þ OðG1Þ: ð17Þ
By Lemma 2 we haveupðHÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZðdÞ
1
jSDðldÞj
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ : ð18ÞSince p 2 B we havepi\G
1 for i[G:Hence noting that the number of d over which the sum in (18) is taken is ﬁnite (less than mm), applying Lemma 4 we obtainupðHÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZGðdÞ
1
jSDðldÞj
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ þ OðG1Þ: ð19ÞAnalyzing (19) in more detail, we note that each q splits into q1 and q2 according to the image being greater than 0 and less
or equal to G, or not. Taking this into account we can write (19) asupðHÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
1
jSDðldÞj
X
q2ZGðdÞ
q¼q1[q2
Y
i2Domðq1Þ
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ
Y
i2Domðq2Þ
pqðiÞ þ OðG1Þ ð20ÞwhereImðq1Þ# f1;2; . . . ;Gg; Imðq2Þ# f0;Gþ 1; . . .g:
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q2ZGðdÞ
q¼q1[q2
Y
i2Domðq1Þ
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ
Y
i2Domðq2Þ
pqðiÞto (20) for a ﬁxed d. This can be written asX
D# f1;...;ldg
X
q12T1ðD;GÞ
Y
i2D
pjdðiÞjq1ðiÞ
 !
Qðf1; . . . ; ldg  DÞ ð21Þwhere T1ðD;GÞ is the set of injective mappings from D to f1;2; . . . ;Gg, and for F# f1; . . . ; ldg
QðFÞ ¼
X
q22T2ðF;GÞ
Y
i2F
pq2ðiÞ;where T2ðF;GÞ is the set of mappings q2 from F to f0;Gþ 1;Gþ 2; . . .g such that
if q2ðiÞ ¼ q2ðjÞ then i ¼ j or q2ðiÞ ¼ q2ðjÞ ¼ 0 :We havep0 þ
X
i>G
pi
 !jFj
 QðFÞ ¼
X
hi1 ;...;ijFj i
YjFj
j¼1
pij ; ð22Þwhere the summation on the right hand side is over those hi1; . . . ; ijFji 2 f0;Gþ 1; . . . gjFj for which some entry other than 0 is
repeated. FurthermoreX
hi1 ;...;ijFj i
YjFj
j¼1
pij 6
jFj
2
  X
i>G
p2i
 !
p0 þ
X
i>G
pi
 !jFj2and we haveX
i>G
p2i
 !
6 G1
X
i>G
pi
 !
6 G1; p0 þ
X
i>G
pi 6 1 and
jFj
2
 
6 m2:Consequently,X
hi1 ;...;ijFji
YjFj
j¼1
pij 6 m
2G1 : ð23ÞMoreover, for a ﬁxed DX
q12T1ðD;GÞ
Y
i2D
pjdðiÞjq1ðiÞ
 !
6 1;so since the number of possible D is less or equal to 2m using (22) and (23) we can conclude that (21) is within some 2mm2G1
of  ! !X
D# f1;...;ldg
X
q12T1ðD;GÞ
Y
i2D
pjdðiÞjq1ðiÞ p0 þ
X
i>G
pi
jf1;...;ldgDj
ð24Þand hence since the number of d 2 Rf ðHÞ is ﬁnite ð6 mmÞ, (20) is within OðG1Þ ofX
d2Rf ðHÞ
1
jSDðldÞj
X
D# f1;...;ldg
X
q12T1ðD;GÞ
Y
i2D
pjdðiÞjq1ðiÞ
 !
p0 þ
X
i>G
pi
 !jf1;...;ldgDj
ð25Þwhich is the same as (18) only with p replaced by IGðpÞ i.e. the same as uIGðpÞðHÞ. This proves the claim.
Let C > 0 be such thatjupðHÞ  uIGðpÞðHÞj 6 CG1:
To prove the lemma, ﬁrst note that for each G 2 N; f (as deﬁned in the statement of the lemma) restricted to the set
HG ¼ fy 2 H jyi ¼ 0 for all i > Gg is a polynomial when viewed as a mapping from this set (with the usual metric inherited
from RG) to R. Let gG be the corresponding constant satisfyingjf ðy1Þ  f ðy2Þj 6 gGky1  y2k 6 gGGmax jy1i  y2i j j i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;G

 
:Note that for y ¼ hy1; y2; . . .i 2 H we have IGðhðyÞÞ ¼ hðhy1; . . . ; yG;0; . . .iÞ.
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are within =ð3GgGÞ of z on the ﬁrst G coordinates, i.e. maxfjyi  zij j i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;Gg 6 =ð3GgGÞ. Then for y 2 U9 A la
marginjf ðyÞ  f ðzÞj ¼ uhðyÞðHÞ  uhðzÞðHÞ		 		 6 uhðyÞðHÞ  uIGðhðyÞÞðHÞ		 		þ uIGðhðyÞÞðHÞ  uIGðhðzÞÞðHÞ		 		þ uIGðhðzÞÞðHÞ  uhðzÞðHÞ		 		
6 CG1 þ gGGmaxfjyi  zij j i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;Gg þ CG1 ¼ ;as required to complete the proof of the lemma. h
Using the fact that h is a bijection fromH to B and that h1 maps Borel subsets of B to Borel subsets ofH now gives us our
main Representation Theorem for homogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx:
Theorem 8. If w is homogeneous and satisﬁes Sx then there is a probability measure l on B such that for a state description
Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞwðHÞ ¼
Z
B
upðHÞdlðpÞ: ð26ÞConversely any such probability function w on SL deﬁned in this way satisﬁes Sx.
Proof. Let l ¼ ~lh1 in Theorem 6. h
Although the above representation theorem is stated for homogenous probability functions, other probability functions
that are mixtures of homogenous and t-heterogenous ones can also have such a representation. In fact – as shown in [20] and
discussed in the last section of this paper – probability functions on non purely unary languages which can be represented in
this way are exactly those that belong to a language invariant family9 of probability functions satisfying Sx, and in each such
case the representing measure uniquely characterizes the language invariant family. This makes representations via the up
rather desirable and special. On the other hand it also follows from results in [20] that no t-heterogenous probability function
has such a representation.
In the next section we shall however show how the functions up and our proof need to be modiﬁed in order to obtain a
corresponding representation theorem for t-heterogeneous probability functions satisfying Sx. In fact such a theorem had
already been proved in [28] (via a generalization to the polyadic case of an alternative representation theorem (for binary
L) in [25]) but being so close it seems opportune to derive it again directly here.
5. The representation theorem – heterogenous case
In this section we shall assume that w is a t-heterogeneous probability function satisfying Sx.
Deﬁne Ht to be the spaceHt ¼ ~y ¼ hy1; . . . ; yti jy1 P . . .P yt P 0;
Xt
i¼1
yi ¼ 1
( )with the usual topology inherited from Rt . Note that Ht is compact. Let Bt be the subspace of Ht containing those ~y with
yt > 0.
First we deﬁne probability functions v~p for ~p 2 Ht in a similar fashion to the way we deﬁned earlier deﬁned the up. The
deﬁnition is simpler in that there is no p0 and the~p are now vectors of length t rather than inﬁnite sequences. However, there
is the added complication of not choosing the allowed extensionsHþ with equal probability but choosing them so that when
continuing the process, the spectra of state descriptions that are being chosen for ~p 2 Bt must eventually have length t.
Let ~p ¼ hp1; p2; . . . ; pti 2 Ht . For a state description Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ and
~c ¼ hc1; c2; . . . ; cmi 2 f1;2; . . . ; tgmwe deﬁne j~pðHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ inductively as follows:
Set j~pð>; ;Þ ¼ 1. Suppose that at stage m we have deﬁned the probability
j~pðHðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ;~cÞ. Pick colour cmþ1 from 1;2; . . . ; t according to the probabilities p1; p2; . . . ; pt and let~cþ ¼ hc1; . . . ; ;cm; cmþ1i:
If cmþ1 is the same as an earlier colour, cj say, extend Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ to the unique state description Hþðb1; b2; . . . ; bm; bmþ1Þ
for which bjHþbmþ1. Otherwise extend randomly observing biHkþ1bj when i; j 6 m and ci ¼ cj so that the probability of Hþ
being chosen isNðSðHþ~c Þ;~1tÞ
NðSðH~cÞ;~1tÞwhere H~c and H
þ
~c are the state descriptions resulting from H and H
þ, respectively by restricting them tonguage invariant family is a family of probability functions wL (for languagesL as in this paper) such that wheneverLþ is an extension ofL then wL
þ
alized to L is wL . A particular probability function w is said to be Language Invariant if it is a member of such a family.
J. Landes et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 35–55 49fbi j for all j < i; ci – cjg:Finally let j~pðHþ;~cþÞ be j~pðH;~cÞ times the probability as described of going from H;~c to Hþ;~cþ.
As before, we now setv~pðHÞ ¼
X
~c
j~pðH;~cÞ:It is not difﬁcult to show that v~p satisﬁes Sx and for~p 2 Bt it is t-heterogeneous. Moreover, for a ﬁxedH;v~pðHÞ is continuous
as a function of ~p on Ht .
Lemma 9. For a state description Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ we havev~pðHÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
X
q2ZtðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
NðSðHfbk1 ; . . . ; bkiþ1gÞ;~1tÞ
NðSðHfbk1 ; . . . ; bkigÞ;~1tÞ
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
Nð~rd;~1tÞ
Nð;;~1tÞ
X
q2Zt ðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ ;where~rd is as in Lemma 3 and the kj are the minimal elements of the equivalence classes in d, in increasing order.
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of v~p in the same way that Lemma 2 follows from the deﬁnition of up. h
Deﬁne discrete measures ln on Ht as follows: For ~r ¼ hr1;r2; . . . ;rhi a spectrum on n with h 6 t and~pr ¼ r1n ;
r2
n
; . . .
rh
n
;0; . . . ; 0
D E
2 Htletlnð~prÞ ¼
X
W2SDðnÞ
SðWÞ¼~r
wðWÞ ¼Nð;; ~rÞwð~rÞ :Let lnð~pÞ ¼ 0 otherwise.
Since Ht is compact the ln have a convergent subsequence. Let the limit be l. Notice that by t-heterogeneity l actually
gives Bt measure 1 and hence can be treated as a measure on Bt . We shall show that for any state description H on nwðHÞ ¼
Z
Bt
v~pðHÞdlð~pÞ :Let H 2 SDðmÞ have spectrum s1; . . . ; ss. We only need to consider s 6 t since otherwise wðHÞ ¼ v~pðHÞ ¼ 0 for all ~p 2 Ht .
Furthermore by the t-heterogeneity of w we havewðHÞ ¼
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rhi
h6t
Nð~s; ~rÞwð~rÞ;hencewðHÞ ¼
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rhi
h6t
Nð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞlnð~prÞ: ð27ÞBy (8) and (9) we have for ~r ¼ hr1; . . . ;rhi, as beforeNð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
Nð~rd;~1hÞ
Nð;;~1hÞ
X
q2ZhðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
n
~r
 1
: ð28ÞBy Lemma 5, for a ﬁxed d,X
q2ZhðdÞ
nm
rq  jdj;rrest
 
n
~r
 1
¼
X
q2ZhðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
rqðiÞ
n
 jdðiÞj
þ O n12
 
:Writing ~pr ¼ hp1; . . . ; pti this becomes
X
q2Zt ðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ þ O n
1
2
 
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Nð;; ~rÞ ¼
X
d2Rf ðHÞ
Nð~rd;~1hÞ
Nð;;~1hÞ
X
q2ZtðdÞ
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞ
0
@
1
Aþ O n12 :When h ¼ t, this isv~pr ðHÞ þ O n12
 
:Hence by (27), wðHÞ is within O n12
 
ofX
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rhi
h6t
v~pr ðHÞlnð~prÞ þ
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rhi
h<t
Nð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞ  v
~pr ðHÞ
 
lnð~prÞ:Taking in account the deﬁnition of ln, this equalsZ
Ht
v~pðHÞdlnð~pÞ þ
X
~r2SpecðnÞ
~r¼hr1 ;...;rhi
h<t
Nð~s; ~rÞ
Nð;; ~rÞ  v
~pr ðHÞ
  X
W2SDðnÞ
SðWÞ¼~r
wðWÞ:The second term is in absolute value less or equal to2
X
W2SDðnÞ
jSðWÞj<t
wðWÞ
0
BB@
1
CCAand as such tends to 0 when n tends to inﬁnity since w is t-heterogenous. The ﬁrst term tends toZ
Ht
v~pðHÞdlð~pÞso, since l concentrates all the measure on Bt , we have:
Theorem 10. If w is t-heterogenous and satisﬁes Sx then there is a probability measure l on Bt such that for Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ a
state descriptionwðHÞ ¼
Z
Bt
v~pðHÞdlð~pÞ:Conversely any such probability function w on SL deﬁned in this way satisﬁes Sx and is t-heterogenous.6. Adding equality
In this section we give an application of the Representation Theorem 6 to characterize exactly which probability functions
w in L (L now possibly purely unary) can be extended to a probability function weq on Lð¼Þ also satisfying Sx, where prob-
ability functions on Lð¼Þ are deﬁned as before but with the axioms of equality assumed in the deﬁnition of ‘ as usual. We
adopt the convention that a probability function on a language with equality will be denoted by a letter with subscript eq.
Consistent sentences of the form Dðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ, where as usual the bi are some distinct constants from L andDðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ ¼
m^
i;j¼1
ðbi ¼ bjÞ; ð29Þare called equality tables on ~b and the set of such sentences (29) is denoted ETðm;~bÞ, or just ETðmÞ when ~b is clear from the
context. Any D 2 ETðmÞ deﬁnes an equivalence D on f1;2; . . . ;mg,iDj() D  bi ¼ bj:
As expected let SðDÞ be the spectrum of this equivalence relation, that is the vector of sizes of the non-empty equivalence
classes with respect to D in non-increasing order.
A probability function weq on Lð¼Þ is determined by its values on sentences of the form
ðD ^HÞðb1; . . . ; bmÞ;where D 2 ETðmÞ and H 2 SDLðmÞ. We will call these sentences state descriptions with equality. Note that for such a state
description with equality to be consistent, D must be a reﬁnement of H, denoted DEH, so D alone determines the clas-
ses of indistinguishable individuals with respect to such a state description with equality. Hence weq satisﬁes Sx if
10 It c
equality
11 It n
J. Landes et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2009) 35–55 51weqððD ^HÞðb1; . . . ; bmÞÞfor consistent D ^H depends only onSðDÞ. Note that if weq satisﬁes Sx then the restriction w of weq to L satisﬁes Sx since for
Hðb1; b2; . . . ; bmÞ a state description for L,wðHÞ ¼
X
D2ETðmÞ
weqðD ^HÞ:Before proving the main theorem of this section the following lemma will be needed, and is of some interest in its own right.
Lemma 11. Let w1eq satisfy Sx on a language L1ð¼Þ and let L2 be a language extending L1 (with just ﬁnitely many relations etc. as
usual). Then w1eq has a unique extension w
2
eq to L2ð¼Þ satisfying Sx.
Proof. First note that if w2eq is to be such an extension then it would have to satisfy that if D 2 ETðmÞ and H;U 2 SDL2 ðmÞ are
such that D ^H;D ^U are consistent, then w2eqðD ^HÞ ¼ w2eqðD ^UÞ. Hence it is forced thatw2eqðD ^HÞ ¼
w2eqðDÞ
jSDL2 ðjSðDÞjÞj ¼
w1eqðDÞ
jSDL2 ðjSðDÞjÞj ð30Þsince jSDL2 ðjSðDÞjÞj is the number of state descriptions U 2 SDL2 ðmÞ such that D ^U is consistent. It only remains then to
show that w2eq deﬁned in this way is (more precisely extends to) a probability function since Sx then follows from (30)
(due to the fact that w2eqðD ^HÞ only depends on SðDÞ), and w2eq extends w1eq.
To show that w2eq is indeed a probability function it is enough to show that for H 2 SDL2 ðmÞ;D 2 ETðmÞ and D ^H
consistentw2eq ðD ^HÞ ¼
X
Hþ2 SDL2 ðmþ1Þ
Dþ2 ETðmþ1Þ
HþH
DþD
w2eqðDþ ^HþÞ : ð31ÞBut from (30),w2eqðD ^HÞ ¼
w1eqðDÞ
jSDL2 ðjSðDÞjÞj ¼
X
Dþ2ETðmþ1Þ
DþD
w1eqðDþÞ
jSDL2 ðjSðDþÞjÞj 
jSDL2 ðjSðDþÞjÞj
jSDL2 ðjSðDÞjÞj ð32Þand the ﬁrst fraction in the summation (32) is w2eqðDþ ^HþÞ for any Hþ such that Dþ ^Hþ is consistent. The second fraction
equals the number of extensions Hþ of H such that Dþ ^Hþ is consistent so (32) equates to the right hand side of (31), as
required. h
Lemma 11 shows that once we have one probability function weq satisfying Sx on a language Lð¼Þ (indeed = could be the
only relation symbol in Lð¼Þ) then we can extend (and if necessary subsequently marginalize)weq to awLeq on any languageL
(subject to the usual limitations, with or without equality) and retain Sx. Furthermore the probability functions wLeq formed
in this way can be seen to form a language invariant family satisfying Sx, even when this notion is extended to allow equality
in the language.
With this lemma and observations to hand we are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 12. Let w be a probability function on L that satisﬁes Sx. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) w has an extension weq on Lð¼Þ satisfying Sx.
(2) w has a representation in the formwðHÞ ¼
Z
B
upðHÞdlðpÞ: ð33Þ(3) w is a member of a language invariant family of probability functions wL satisfying Sx.10
Furthermore, when the language L is not purely unary and (1) holds then the extension weq and the language invariant family in (3)
are unique.11
Proof. That (2) and (3) are equivalent is proved in [20]. From Lemma 11 and the above discussion we know that (1) implies
(3). So it is enough to show that (2) implies (1).an be easily seen from the theorem and the above discussion that w being a member of a language invariant family satisfying Sx, where we also allow
in the language, is another equivalent condition.
eed not be unique when L is purely unary, see [20].
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notice that in the deﬁnition of up a choice of the same non-black colour for bi and bj means that they can never be
distinguished whereas choices of black or different colours may allow bi and bj to initially look indistinguishable but a
further bk could prove them different.
Hence we are led to the following deﬁnition. Letting d ¼ fdð1Þ; . . . dðldÞg stand for D we deﬁne12 Kin
that theupeqððD ^HÞðb1; . . . ; bmÞÞ ¼
X
q2ZðdÞ
1
jSDðldÞj
Yld
i¼1
pjdðiÞjqðiÞfor D ^H consistent and 0 otherwise.
In other words, we deﬁne upeqððD ^HÞðb1; . . . ; bmÞÞ to be the probability that the process which is used to deﬁne up yields
Hðb1; . . . ; bmÞ employing colours c1; . . . ; cm such that ci; cj are equal and non-zero just when iDj.
It is apparent that upeq is a probability function on Lð¼Þ and that it satisﬁes Sx. Furthermore it can be seen from (7) that it
extends up, that is, for H 2 SDðmÞ
upeqðHÞ ¼
X
D2ETðmÞ
upeqðD ^HÞ ¼ upðHÞ: ð34ÞTo extend a w on L that possesses a representation as in (33) we takeweqðD ^HÞ ¼
Z
B
upeqðD ^HÞdlðpÞ:By (34) this does indeed extend w.
Finally, assume again that L has a non-unary predicate. To show the uniqueness of an extension weq of w when it exists
note that the ordering on the class of equivalences on f1; . . . ;mg deﬁned above by
1E2 () 1is a refinement of2is well founded.
Suppose that w1eq and w
2
eq were two extensions of w to Lð¼Þ. Then for H 2 SDLðmÞ; i ¼ 1;2,wðHÞ ¼
X
D2ETðmÞ
DEH
wieqðD ^HÞ ¼
X
D2ETðmÞ
D¼H
wieqðD ^HÞ þ
X
D2ETðmÞ
D/H
wieqðD ^HÞ ð35ÞwhereD / H () DEH and H5D:Thus the right hand sides of (35) are equal for w1eq and w
2
eq. Taking H to be the bottom element of the ordering E, i.e. where
all the equivalence classes are singletons, we obtain thatX
D2ETðmÞ
D¼H
w1eqðD ^HÞ ¼
X
D2ETðmÞ
D¼H
w2eqðD ^HÞ:By Sx all the terms in each of these sums have the same probability so it follows that for D 2 ETðmÞ;H ¼ D,w1eqð~1mÞ ¼ w1eqðD ^HÞ ¼ w2eqðD ^HÞ ¼ w2eqð~1mÞ:Note that it is at this stage that we needed L to contain a non-unary predicate because for a purely unary L with q predicates
there is no H 2 SDLðmÞ with spectrum ~1m when m > 2q.
Similarly from (35) induction on the ordering E of indistinguishability equivalences of state descriptions for Lð¼Þ shows
that w1eq and w
2
eq agree on all spectra and hence agree everywhere.
Uniqueness of the language invariant family containing w is proved in [19, pp. 156–157]. h
In the course of proving this theorem we have in fact derived also the following representation theorem which is of some
independent interest and has already appeared in fact, in other clothing, in Kingman [15, p. 376].12
Corollary 13. Let weq be a probability function on Lð¼Þ that satisﬁes Sx. Then weq has a representation in the formweqðD ^HÞ ¼
Z
B
upeqðD ^HÞdlðpÞ: ð36ÞConversely any weq deﬁned in this way satisﬁes Sx.gman’s result is actually stronger in that it gives that the measure l is unique, something which we have not proved. In view of Theorem 12 this gives
measure l in (26) is also unique.
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restricted to L, has an extension to Lð¼Þ by Theorem 12 w has a representation in the form (33). In turn then w has an exten-
sion to Lð¼Þ satisfying Sx given by R
B
upeq dlðpÞ and by the uniqueness of this extension it must be the same as weq.
The converse is immediate. h
We now give an example which illustrates the value of such representation theorems.
From [29] it is known that if L is purely unary and hs1; . . . ; ssi; hr1; . . . ;rti 2 SpecðmÞ then wð~sÞ 6 wð~rÞ for all w satisfying
Ax (i.e. the unary version of Sx) if and only if ~s^~r, where ^ is deﬁned on SpecðmÞ by13 In [~s^~r()
Xi
j¼1
sj 6
Xi
j¼1
rj for all 1 6 i 6 mand we take sj ¼ 0 for s < j 6 m;rj ¼ 0 for t < j 6 m.13
This is potentially useful result because it says that once we accept the underlying assumption Ax then our beliefs (i.e.
assigned probabilities) are bound to satisfy certain preferences, and furthermore given the simple form of ^ we can easily
read off these preferences.
In view of this result then it is natural to ask if it holds also for non-unary languages when Ax is replaced by Sx. The
answer to this question is now known for a large class of probability functions satisfying Sx. For example we can resolve
the issue when we allow in equality – the immediate answer in this case is ‘No’ since if we take p which puts all the prob-
ability on black (i.e. p ¼ h1;0;0;0; . . .i) thenupeqðb1 ¼ b2Þ ¼ upeqðh2iÞ ¼ 0 < upeqðh1;1iÞ ¼ upeqðb1 – b2Þ ¼ 1
despite the fact that on Specð2Þ h1;1i 
 h2i.
However if we require that j~sj ¼ j~rj then the inequality does hold, see [18, Theorem 19], namely:
Proposition 14. Suppose that~s; ~r 2 SpecðmÞ with j~sj ¼ j~rj ¼ s. Then weqð~sÞ 6 weqð~rÞ for all weq satisfying Sx if and only if~s^~r.
Proof. Going from left to right notice that it is enough by Corollary 13 to prove the result for upeq, that is to show thatX
q1
Ys
i¼1
psiq1ðiÞ 6
X
q2
Ys
i¼1
priq2ðiÞ ð37Þwhere q1 ranges over all injections from f1;2; . . . ; sg to N such that
if q1ðiÞ ¼ q1ðjÞ then i ¼ j or q1ðiÞ ¼ q1ðjÞ ¼ 0;
if q1ðiÞ ¼ 0 then si ¼ 1;and similarly for q2 with ri in place of si.
Now by considering the sum over K# f1; . . . ; sg and T#Nþ with jTj ¼ jKj it is enough to show that (37) holds when we
restrict q1, q2 to take value 0 on f1; . . . ; sg  K and map K one-to-one onto T. Furthermore since~s^~r ri will be 1 whenever si
is 1 so if, for a particular K, the corresponding right hand side of (37) is zero (because some ri > 1 with i R K) then so will the
corresponding left hand side. Hence it is enough to show the inequality holds for K such that si;ri ¼ 1 for i R K .
But in this case the inequality simpliﬁes topsjKj0
X
q
Y
i2K
psiqðiÞ 6 p
sjKj
0
X
q
Y
i2K
priqðiÞ;where now q is a bijection from K to T, and as such is an instance of Muirhead’s Inequality, see [11, p. 44] (or [29, Theorem 2]
for a proof within the present notation), or else is trivial if p0 ¼ 0.
In the other direction suppose that for some i,Xi
j¼1
sj >
Xi
j¼1
rj:In this case let p be such that pj ¼ , with  > 0 very small, for i < j 6 s, pj ¼ ð1 ðs iÞÞ=i for 1 6 j 6 i and pj ¼ 0 otherwise.
Thenupeqð~sÞ > upeqð~rÞ
sinceupeqð~sÞP i!ðs iÞ!ðð1 ðs iÞÞ=iÞkskjSDLðsÞj1;
upeqð~rÞ ¼ OðsrÞ;29] this is referred to as the ‘Only Rule’ since on the basis of Ax it is the only such rule that holds in general.
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Xi
j¼1
sj >
Xi
j¼1
rj ¼ r: The proof of Proposition 14 provides a good example of one of the values of representation theorems such as those pre-
sented here. Namely they may allow us to reduce the problem of showing that all probability functions in some class satisfy a
property to the problem of showing that special, and easily comprehended, representatives from that class satisfy the prop-
erty. In the case in question showing that the required inequality holds for the upeq. (In fact this same proposition can also be
proved for any w (without equality) satisfying the representation given in (33), again by considering just the case for the up.
Details may be found in [22].)7. Conclusions
We have proved two de Finetti style representation theorems which, together with the general version of [25, Theorem 7],
see [18], cover all probability functions (on a not purely unary language) satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability. The value of
such a result is that it enables us to tap into the very special forms of the up and v~p and the well developed theory of the
integral and differential calculus in order prove further results about such probability functions. In particular in this paper
we have exploited the representation to characterize when a probability function on L satisfying Sx can be extended to one
on Lð¼Þ also satisfying Sx.
In [19,20] the method was also used to characterize the property of language invariance in the presence of Sx and in [22]
it again found (apparently) essential use in deriving a particular (polyadic) Principle of Instantial Relevance. It is to be hoped
that further uses may emerge in future, in particular in relation to a wider range of relevance principles in polyadic inductive
logic.
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